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Abstract
This study tests two of the main explanations of the formation of political ties. The first
explanation is based on the homophily principle and states that political actors are more likely
to form a relationship if they have similar policy preferences. The second explanation, from
network theory, predicts that the likelihood of a tie between two actors depends on the
presence of certain relationships with other actors. For instance, two actors are more likely to
form a tie if they share many transitive linkages with other actors. We examine the evolution
of cooperation networks in the Council of the European Union as a testing ground for
propositions from these approaches. Our data consist of a unique combination of actors’
policy positions and their network relations over time. We find evidence that both preference
similarity and indirect ties affect the development of network relations throughout the
Council’s committees, although there appears to be significant variation in the extent to which
preference similarity affects network evolution. We consider the implications of these
findings for the stock of social capital held in the Council and for understanding the
consensual mode decision-making highlighted by previous studies of the Council. These
issues are highly pertinent given the challenges posed by the prospect of Brexit.
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Why are some political actors more likely to form cooperative relations than others? This question
is central to understanding the workings of political systems in which actors both vie for influence
over policy outcomes and attempt to solve collective action problems (Heclo, 1978; Laumann and
Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Bardach, 1998; Feiock and Scholz, 2009). Two broad types of
explanations of political actors’ network relations have been advanced (König and Bräuninger,
1998; Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004; Thurner and Binder, 2009; Berardo and Scholz,
2010; Henry, Lubell and McCoy, 2011; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012). First, homophily refers to
the tendency of actors to seek ties with others who hold similar individual social, cultural or
political characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). In policy networks, similar
policy preferences are likely to induce cooperation as they signal the existence of congruent
cognitive frameworks regarding relevant policy problems (Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004;
Gerber, Henry and Lubell, 2013). Moreover, forming coalitions with like-minded actors may
increase one’s bargaining leverage (Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012).
Second, network theory holds that characteristics of the larger network within which actors
are embedded trigger mechanisms that affect the likelihood that those actors form ties with each
other (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Schneider et al., 1997; Burt, 2005). For instance, some
network models posit that the presence of many transitive and facilitating links between two
actors, based on shared relations with third parties, strengthen the social trust they have in each
other. This in turn increases the likelihood that a cooperative relation will develop between them.
Other characteristics of the network, such as the presence of facilitating and reciprocal links, also
feature in network-based explanations of political ties (Henry, Lubell and McCoy, 2011).
The size and direction of the effect of policy preferences compared to network
characteristics have strong implications for the impact of cooperation ties on decision-making
processes and outcomes. If, for instance, actors tend to cooperate with others who hold similar
preferences, then the effects of network ties may strengthen existing preferences. The network
will then have little effect on changing policy preferences, but may instead increase polarization
within the network. Strong ties between likeminded actors mean that networks reinforce
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differences among clusters and mobilize bias within the system. A downside of homophily,
therefore, is group polarization and extremism, and a generally weakened potential for networks
to solve collective action problems (Freeman, 1978; Jackson, 2010). By contrast, if actors
frequently have ties with others with whom they disagree, network relations may be channels
through which disagreements are played out and eventually resolved. If the network structure
creates cross-cutting ties, homophilous clusters and polarization may be mitigated.
The potential of networks to generate trust and solve collective action problems is
particularly salient when it comes to international cooperation between states, where majoritarian
decision-making is less relevant and legitimate. For example, notwithstanding its current crises,
the European Union (EU) is a political system that has historically been able to overcome
differences and resolve controversies without leaving disappointed minorities behind. EU
member states are diverse in terms of wealth, population sizes, domestic regulatory regimes and
administrative cultures. Finding agreement on controversial issues therefore often requires
protracted discussions in which state representatives communicate their policy demands and listen
to those of others. How the relevant policy networks operate is likely to have important
implications for decision-making in such a system.
We examine network relations in the Council of the European Union (formerly referred to as
the Council of Ministers), which is the most powerful decision-making body in the EU. The
research design brings together the datasets from two major studies of decision-making in the EU.
The first study examined the network relations between each pair of member states in the main
subcommittees of the Council at three time points: 2003, 2006 and 2009 (Naurin and Lindahl,
2010). The second study focused on decision-making on controversial legislative proposals in the
period 1998-2008, and includes information on the policy positions of each of the member states
on the issues raised by selected proposals (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011).
Using the stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich,
2010), we analyze the network evolution of cooperative ties among EU member states in several
Council committees: the high-level coordinating committee Coreper I and five policy-oriented
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working-group committees (dealing with agriculture, environment, taxation, justice, and
competition). We examine whether the networks change over time in line with theoretical
propositions concerning preference similarity and network structures. Rather than focusing on
dyadic ties, SAOM explicitly specifies and models actors’ utilities in a network setting, and thus
deals appropriately with the interdependencies among our observations. Moreover, the
actor-oriented approach of SAOM allows us to combine analyses of multiple policy-oriented
committees and compare them with Coreper I.
We find that both preference similarity and the existence of shared partners increase the
chances of cooperation. The evidence suggests that to some extent the strength of these effects
depend on the political-strategic context. Homophily, in terms of preference similarity, affects the
evolution of the network relations both in the high-level committee of Coreper I and in some of
the policy-specific working groups. The effect of preference similarity is stronger in the
policy-oriented working groups than in Coreper for the committees for which we have
comparable data with Coreper. Social network relations based on transitive and facilitating links
are important in explaining network evolution at all levels of the Council.
I Policy preferences as explanations of network ties
Policy preferences feature prominently in some explanations of network ties (König and
Bräuninger, 1998; Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004; Berardo and Scholz, 2010; Leifeld and
Schneider, 2012). Research on lobbying, for example, has found that two actors are more likely to
form a tie if their preferences are more congruent (Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004, p.
224-5). Signaling theory examines interest groups’ decisions to initiate influence attempts and
elected representatives’ decisions to receive such influence based on, among other factors, the
congruence between interest groups and representatives’ interests (Austen-Smith and Wright,
1992; Austen-Smith, 1993; Ainsworth, 1993). The game played between interest groups and
representatives is defined by interest groups’ aim of maximizing their influence on policies and
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representatives’ aim of identifying policies that maximize their chances of reelection.
Ainsworth’s (1993) model focuses on the costs that lobbyists incur when convincing
representatives that their interests are aligned to those of representatives’ constituents.
Austin-Smith and Wright’s (1992) model examines how representatives select the lobbying
attempts that congrue with their constituents’ interests. Interest groups have incentives to engage
in counteractive lobbying to convince decision makers who hold different preferences from theirs,
at least under certain conditions. But decision makers always prefer to receive information from
lobbyists whose preferences are similar to theirs. Signaling theory therefore features the actions
of both senders and recipients of information in its explanation of network ties between actors.
Studies of interest groups are relevant to our focus in that they highlight the relevance of
similarities between actors’ preferences to explaining the occurrence of ties. Our focus on ties
between decision makers in the committees of the Council of the EU is distinct in that all of the
actors we consider have at least some voting power. Nonetheless, contacts among decision makers
also take place in settings with imperfect information, where the actors hold different levels of
information regarding the consequences of different policies in response to a policy problem. One
important signal regarding the trustworthiness of information from other committee members is
the extent to which those members had congruent preferences on similar issues in the past.
Existing studies also suggest that the impact of preference similarity on cooperative ties
varies across different settings. Leifeld and Schneider (2012) argue that the impact of preference
similarity may be qualified by the type of information exchange that takes place. Preference
similarity is likely to be important when actors coordinate on political-strategic issues, such as
forming instrumental alliances in order to influence policy outcomes. In such situations,
coordination is more likely to be beneficial when the actors share similar policy goals. This is also
a key proposition of the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
For actors who are in a more deliberative mode, by contrast, exchanging technical and
scientific information in order to reduce complexity and increase their understanding of the issues
that are on the table, a different dynamic may arise. When the network relations concern
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exchange of technical information, actors are more likely to turn to well informed others, who
may not necessarily be allies with respect to policy goals. For that reason, Leifeld and Schneider
(2012, p. 735) argue that the effect of preference similarity is less pronounced in networks in
which the actors are focused on exchanging technical information, than in networks in which the
actors are focused on political and strategic issues.
In sum, preference similarity strongly predicts the emergence of cooperative ties in settings
where the political stakes are high, but less so in settings where actors engage mainly in technical
discussions. The supposed relevance of preference similarity to settings in which the political
stakes are high might lead us to expect greater effects in the high-level Coreper committee than in
the policy-specific committees. However, the policy-specific committees are also where the
majority of controversies are resolved and therefore the level at which states have greatest
opportunities to influence policy outcomes. This might lead us to expect stronger effects of
preference similarity on network evolution in the policy-specific working groups. We therefore
explore whether preference similarity influences network evolution in the Council and how the
strength of the homophily mechanism varies across the different levels of the Council’s hierarchy.
II Network characteristics as explanations of ties
Social capital theory holds that actors are embedded in complex social relations, which connect
actors to each other via multiple paths, and that these social structures condition trust (Coleman,
1988; Putnam, 1993; Schneider et al., 1997). These links are more than just channels through
which actors send information; they also support mechanisms through which actors monitor and
sanction each other in the event of behaviour that violates social norms and creates collectively
sub-optimal outcomes. Burt (2005) refined and formalized concepts from social capital theory
with a view to identifying measurable aspects of social capital, notably the concepts of bridging
and bonding social capital. Bridging ties are ties that connect otherwise unconnected sets of
actors, even filling structural holes. Bonding ties connect otherwise connected sets of actors with
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new reinforcing links Berardo and Scholz (2010)argue that such bonding ties help provide
credible commitments in high-risk cooperation dilemmas.
In light of this, social capital theory suggests that existing ties and their patterns (i.e. network
characteristics) predict future ties. Unlike preference similarity, which focuses on dependencies
between a pair of actors, social capital theory highlights the dependencies between ties in the
evolution of cooperative networks. In this study, we explore three types of network
characteristics: reciprocity, triad, and hub.
A Reciprocity
Reciprocity is perhaps the most basic and well-studied network attribute. Reciprocity simply
implies that actor i is more likely to report a tie with actor j if j reports a tie with i. For many,
reciprocity is key to promote and sustain the norms of coordination and cooperation among
network members (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Ostrom (1998) argues that when
reciprocity prevails, network members are motivated to acquire a reputation for keeping promises
and performing actions with short-term costs but long-term net benefits. Reciprocal ties,
therefore, are regarded as a salient characteristic of networks with high levels of social capital.
The importance of reciprocity in international settings has been frequently emphasized.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that reciprocity is the main organizing principle that enables
states to overcome collective action problems (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Since states enter
games of cooperation repeatedly, reciprocity and the strategies associated with reciprocity, such
as tit-for-tat, introduce effective sanctions and foster international cooperation under anarchy
(Axelrod, 1984). Moreover, reciprocal linkages build mutually beneficial dependencies and
obligations between the actors involved. Reciprocally connected actors become, at least to some
extent, mutually dependent on each other for the supply of information and other forms of
cooperation. In our following analysis, we expect that EU members tend to establish reciprocal
cooperative ties over time.
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B Triad
Another important class of network characteristics is triadic relations. Research has revealed that
local reciprocity alone is insufficient to maintain cooperation in large groups (Bloch, Genicot and
Ray, 2007). Social pressure in the form of a common friend (i.e. a triadic relation) can effectively
overcome this problem and make cooperation enforceable and renegotiation-proof (Jackson,
Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan, 2012). We therefore base our expectations on Carpenter, Esterling
and Lazer’s (2004, p. 227; also see Holland and Leinhardt, 1971; Fernandez and Gould, 1994;
Wasserman and Faust, 1994) point of departure: “Following a long tradition in network analysis,
the key social structural unit we use to measure the impact of the social structure on the ties
between two actors is the triad”. Berardo and Scholz (2010) also note that the triad is the simplest
structure with which to model bridging and bonding elements of social capital.
More formally, triadic relations involve at least three actors. When considering the
likelihood of a link between actors i and j, we examine all possible third actors (each referred to
as “actor h”). We examine whether the presence of certain links between these third actors and
actors i and j affect the likelihood of a link from i to j. Since international cooperation can be
directional, we distinguish between facilitating links and transitive links as depicted in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 is about here.]
Facilitating links. We expect to observe that actor i is more likely to cooperate with actor j if i
and j are in similar structural positions with respect to third actors. For instance, there may be
many third actors that cooperate with both i and j. Facilitating links may reduce the costs of
cooperation between i and j. Facilitators may also provide a “common frame of reference” to i
and j on policy matters (Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004, p. 228). Likewise, if there are
many actors in the network with which both i and j are not linked, this may also promote a
common frame of reference, since both will be insulated from the influence of the same third
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actors.1
Transitive links. Our expectation is that actor i is more likely to cooperate with actor j if there
are more third actors with transitive links that connect i to j. Actor h provides a transitive link
from i to j if i cooperates with h and h cooperate with j (Figure 1). The importance of transitivity
has long been observed in friendships at the individual level (Davis, 1967; Holland and Leinhardt,
1971), which formalizes the common wisdom that “friends of friends are friends”. Ties that are
embedded within transitive links increase the dependencies between the actors involved. This
dependency increases the possibility of sanctioning non-cooperative behaviour. For instance,
actor i can cooperate with actor j in the knowledge that it (i) could report misbehaviour on the
part of j to h. Since h also cooperates with j, it is likely that j wishes to avoid such sanctioning
behaviour. A related argument concerns the trustworthiness of information flowing from j to i,
which presumably conditions actor i’s decision to cooperate with j (Carpenter, Esterling and
Lazer, 2004; Berardo and Scholz, 2010). If actor i cooperates with h, this implies that i is satisfied
with the information it receives from h. If, as is the case in a transitive link, h also cooperates with
j, this implies that h is also satisfied with the information it receives from j. This positive
evaluation by h of j may increase the trust that i has in the information provided by j, thereby
increasing the likelihood of cooperation.
C Hub
Finally, research on the development of network ties in other contexts has consistently found
evidence of a “Matthew effect”, whereby the rich get richer, which is also referred to as
preferential attachment in network analysis (Barabási and Albert, 1999). The “hubs” in a network,
1This argument suggests that the presence of facilitators, or more generally similarity between
actors in their structural positions, affect actors’ policy positions. As mentioned above, since we
are interested in the effects of both preferences and network structures, our measures of actors’
policy positions should be taken before the time point at which we observe the network ties.
8
which have many incoming network ties, tend to enjoy a cumulative advantage, in which these
popular actors are more likely to be selected than unpopular ones. In international cooperation,
such as that which takes place in the Council of the EU, a popular state with many partners is
expected to attract more new partners than less popular states with fewer existing partners.
III Research design
We integrate two major datasets on network relations (Naurin and Lindahl, 2010) and policy
positions (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011) in the EU. This gives us a unique opportunity to
test both preference and network-based explanations of network ties. More details of the
procedures followed and measures developed in these two studies can be found in the publications
cited above. Here, we give a summary of the main points that are relevant to the present study.
A Measuring cooperation networks
Information on the network relations among member state representatives was obtained through a
survey of officials from the representations of all member states to the EU in Brussels. Three
surveys were conducted, in 2003, 2006 and 2009, which therefore gives data from both before and
after the enlargements in 2004 and 2007. All representatives in eleven selected committees in the
Council were approached for the interviews. Six of these committees are included in the present
study due to data limitations (see Table 1). Both a high-level committee and lower-level working
groups were included, involving a broad range of policy areas, ranging from economic policy to
justice and home affairs. The interviews were conducted by telephone. There was a high response
rate in all three rounds: 81 percent in 2003, 84 percent in 2006 and 86 percent in 2009. In total,
618 member state representatives were interviewed: 130 in 2003, 231 in 2006 and 257 in 2009.
In all three surveys, the following question was asked: “Which member states do you most
often cooperate with within your working group, in order to develop a common position?” On the
basis of the respondents’ answers to this question, we identify the network relations between
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member states. The question posed focuses respondents’ attention on direct contacts with people
from other member states in their working groups. Respondents were free to list other member
states with which they cooperated, and typically mentioned between three and five others.2 Their
answers revealed interesting patterns of cooperation evolution for each surveyed committee.
[Figure 2 is about here.]
Figure 2 depicts how the cooperation network in Coreper I evolved from 2003 to 2009. The
arrow from a first member state to a second one indicates that a representative of the first state
said that he or she cooperates with the second state. The figures show that while in 2003 the
cooperation network was relatively sparse, the network density increased in 2006 after ten new
members joined and appeared to stabilize at that level. The cooperation networks suggest that
reciprocal ties are perhaps not as prevalent as suggested in the earlier literature. Yet we can find
triadic relations do contribute to cooperation diffusion. For example, Portugal and Greece are
isolated from the cooperative network in 2003, but they are included in multiple triadic relations
in 2006. Finally, we can also observe some cooperation “hubs” throughout the time. France,
Germany, and UK consistently receive and send many cooperative ties, suggesting strong
popularity effects.
[Table 1 is about here.]
2It should be noted that the question refers to the other member states with which the
respondent cooperates most often. Directed cooperative ties (i indicating cooperation with j, but
not vice versa) can be interpreted as directed expressions of willingness to cooperate and the
importance of the relationship to the respondent state. For example, a directed non-reciprocated
tie between Slovenia and the UK reflects that Slovenia has to seek cooperation from UK to reach
a common position (i.e. a directed willingness to cooperate), or simply reflects the fact that the
UK representative cooperates more often with Germany and Sweden, and possibly attaches
greater importance to those relationships, than to the relationship with Slovenia. The directed tie,
therefore, indicates that the Slovenia-UK cooperation is valued more highly by the Slovenian
representative than the UK representative.
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Table 1 presents detailed network statistics for each cooperation network across three waves
of the survey. We identify the ratio of triads closed by facilitating and transitive links respectively.
Since the outcomes of both types of network closure are structurally equivalent, we divide the
number of such closed triads by the number of triads where facilitators are present to arrive at the
facilitation index, and by the number of triads where an indirect relation exist to arrive at the
transitivity index. These indices range from a low of 0.25 in 2009 for Coreper I to a high of 0.60
in 2003 also for Coreper I. These conditional tie probability indices are larger than the density of
the network, which is the unconditional tie probability between two randomly sampled countries
in the network. As such the indices indicate that facilitators and indirect relations make ties more
likely.
B Member states’ policy positions
We construct measures of the preference similarity between each pair of member states’ policy
positions based on a study of decision-making on controversial legislative proposals in the period
1998-2008 (Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011). For a selected 125 legislative proposals, a
team of researchers held face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key informants to obtain
information on the controversies raised by these proposals and EU actors’ policy positions on
these controversies. Key informants were asked to “indicate the policy alternative initially favored
by each stakeholder after the introduction of the proposal and before the Council formulated its
common position”.
[Table 2 is about here.]
Table 2 presents an illustration about how policy positions are drawn from the legislative
proposal on sugar sector reform. This was the first important reform of agricultural policy that
took place after the 2004 enlargement. Eleven semi-structured interviews were held with experts
from the member states’ permanent representations, the Commission and the European
Parliament. The main controversial issue raised by this proposal was the size of the price cut,
which would reduce EU subsidies for sugar production. Member states took six distinct policy
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positions on this issue, ranging from Poland’s support for keeping the then current level of
subsidy for sugar production, to Denmark, Estonia and Sweden’s demand for a very large cut in
the intervention price and level of subsidy. Other member states took positions between these
alternatives. The second issue in the sugar case is the extent to which producers should be
compensated for the price cut. The third issue raised by the sugar sector reform concerned the
sequencing of cuts in production quotas for different types of sugar.
The dataset contains detailed information on member states’ policy positions on each of the
125 selected legislative proposals, like that summarized in Table 2. These 125 proposals raised
331 controversial issues, which were described in detail by key informants. Legislative proposals
were selected according to three criteria: the time period, the type of legislative procedure and the
level of political importance. Regarding the time period, legislative proposals were included if
they were on the Council’s agenda in the years 1999 and/or 2000, or were discussed for the first
time in the Council after the 2004 enlargement. Legislative proposals introduced up to June 2008
were included in the post-2004 study. Concerning the decision-making procedure, the selected
legislative proposals were subject to either the consultation or the codecision procedures, the two
most commonly used procedures. Regarding political importance, the selection was restricted to
proposals on which there was an indication of at least some political importance and controversy.
The policy areas represented most prominently in the selection are agriculture (twenty-six
proposals), internal market (eighteen), Justice and Home Affairs (eleven) and fisheries (fourteen).
However, many other policy areas are present too.
Information on controversial issues and actors’ initial positions on these issues was collected
in 349 semi-structured interviews with key informants. These interviews typically lasted between
60 and 90 minutes. The key informants were selected for their knowledge of the detail of the
dossiers under investigation. Individuals with different institutional affiliations were interviewed.
The 47 Commission officials interviewed were responsible for drafting the proposals and/or
monitoring the subsequent discussions. The 236 officials from the permanent representations
were the responsible desk officers. The 45 individuals from the EP were either MEPs or their
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assistants. A further nine interviewees worked in the Council secretariat and twelve in interest
groups.
These data on member states’ policy positions on controversies raised by legislative
proposals are the most appropriate data available for our purposes of testing the preference-based
explanation of network ties. The obvious alternatives, member states’ voting behaviour and
national governments’ ideological positions, are not appropriate. Decision-making in the Council
usually proceeds by consensus, rather than voting. Moreover, voting takes place after the Council
formulates its common position, while the temporal focus of the network data is before the
common position. National governments’ ideological positions do not clearly structure member
states’ policy preferences in the Council (Thomson, 2011). Rather, member states’ policy
positions tend to coalesce by policy sector and on an issue specific basis. Therefore, measures that
are based on the specific controversies dealt with in the Council are most relevant.
C Merging the two datasets
We identified six committees from the network study with which we could match the positional
data from the decision-making study. First, Coreper I was included in all three waves of the
network study, 2003, 2006 and 2009. Coreper I is a high-level coordinating committee, composed
of the deputy ambassadors of the member states EU representations, which deals with legislative
proposals from all policy areas included in the decision-making study. Therefore, we matched the
network relations in a given year with measures of policy agreement based on legislative
proposals that were introduced in previous years. Specifically, we matched the 2003 network data
with legislative proposals that were on the Council’s agenda in 1999 and/or 2000. We matched
the 2006 network data with legislative proposals introduced in the period 2003-2005. This timing
obviously precludes the possibility that our positional data are influenced by the network data.The
dyadic policy agreement measure is the proportion of controversial issues raised by the relevant
set of legislative proposals on which each pair of member states in question took the same policy
position. Our dyadic scores of preference similarity in Coreper I are presented in Figure 3, with
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the shaded shares of pies indicating the degree of preference similarity.
[Figure 3 is about here.]
The other five Council committees we include in this study are policy-specific working
groups dealing with more technical issues and preparing the ground for the meetings of the
Coreper and the ministers. Network data from each committee in a given year were matched with
legislative proposals from the relevant policy area in previous years. We included as many
committees and years as possible, but were limited by the exclusion of some committees from
some years of the network study and by the exclusion of some policy areas from some years of
the decision-making study. As well as Coreper I, the following five committees are included with
network data on at least some years: 1) the working group on agriculture in 2003, 2006 and
2009;3 2) the working group on environmental policy in 2006 and 2009; 3) the working group on
taxation in 2003, 2006 and 2009; 4) the working group on justice and home affairs (Article 36
committee) in 2006 and 2009; and 5) the working group on competition from 2006 and 2009.4
The merged dataset contains 5,694 observations (ordered dyads of member states) for which we
have information on all relevant explanatory variables.
3The network study actually includes two related agricultural working groups, the special
committee on agriculture and the agriculture working group, which contain very similar network
ties. For presentation purpose, we only present analyses based on the agriculture working group.
For additional analyses of the special committee, please see Supporting Information.
4The decision-making study did not include environmental proposals of relevance to the 2003
network data. The network study did not include justice and home affairs or competition in 2003.
The network study also included several other committees for which no relevant positional data
from the decision-making study were available, such as the working group on security issues.
These network data were excluded from the present study.
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IV The network model
This study employs stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) to model the dynamic evolution of
cooperation networks (Snijders, 2005; Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich, 2010).Compared to
other longitudinal network models (e.g., Hanneke, Fu and Xing, 2010; Desmarais and Cranmer,
2012), SAOM is explicitly actor oriented, and assumes that actors change their ties as a
consequence of optimizing an objective function. Based on their perceived interests (i.e. objective
functions), each actor decides whether or not to change an outgoing relationship by creating or
dropping a tie. The network changes are results of simultaneous strategic choices made by
individual actors to maximize their utilities. SAOM therefore deals appropriately with the
interdependencies in our merged dataset.
Specifically, SAOM estimates a range of effects on actors’ decisions, including effects
associated with network structures such as those depicted in Figure 2, and characteristics of egos
(i.e. the actors taking the decisions to create or dissolve links), alters (i.e. the actors to which egos
consider linking), and dyads (i.e. pairs of actors). Our key variable, policy agreement, is a
characteristic of dyads. The odds that an actor will change its outgoing ties is modelled by the
objective function. Actors optimize their objective functions in the sense that they have a higher
probability of forming ties that increase the value of their objective functions. Actors perform this
optimization while being constrained by the network structure in which they find themselves.
Because of the dynamic nature of the model, this constraining network structure encompasses the
changes made earlier by other actors, such that actors constrain each other in a dynamic feedback
process. The addition of random effects to the objective function allows us to account for residual
preferences. The dynamic feedback between actors’ decisions is incorporated into the simulation
procedure discussed below. The objective function for actor i is defined as a weighted sum of
effects,
fi(β ,x) = ∑
k
β kski (x), (1)
where the ski (x) are the set of effects, which in our application include reciprocal, facilitating and
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transitive links, as well as preference similarity. The terms β k are the parameters to be estimated.
To test both preference- and network-based explanations, we examine the impacts of various
dyadic and network factors. The effect of policy agreement on tie formation is included as a
dyadic explanatory variable. If pi j stands for the agreement of countries i and j in policy and p¯
for the mean of pi j, then the effect,
s
policy−congruence
i = ∑
j
xi j(pi j − p¯), (2)
expresses the tendency of these countries to select each other based on this agreement. A positive
β policy−congruence estimate then suggests that country i is more likely to initiate cooperative ties to
countries with whom country i shares higher preference similarity.
To capture the impacts of reciprocity, we include the following effect,
s
reciprocity
i = ∑
j
xi jx ji, (3)
which is defined as the number of reciprocated ties. We expect a positive and significant
β reciprocity when states reciprocate others’ favors and cooperative initiatives.
We operationalize states’ tendency to form transitive links by including:
stransitive−triadi = ∑
j,h
xi jxihxh j, (4)
where i 6= j 6= h. Similarly, we incorporate the occurrence of facilitating links by adding the term,
s
facilitating−triad
i = ∑
j,h
xi jxhixh j, (5)
which incorporates the impact of additional facilitators h on tie creation between actors i and j, as
depicted in Figure 1. In general, positive estimates of above two effects suggests that states
sharing common cooperation partners are more likely to form cooperative ties with each other.
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To account for the distributions of incoming and outgoing ties, we include two further
effects. First, the indegree popularity effect is defined as,
s
indegree−popularity
i = ∑
j
xi j ∑
k
xk j (6)
This effect is also referred to as the popularity of alter effect. It is the sum of the indegrees of the
other actors to which i is tied. A positive estimate represents the tendency for actors to choose
other actors that are already popular cooperation partners in the network. Second, the outdegree
activity effect is defined as,
s
outdegree−activity
i = ∑
j
xi j ∑
k
xik (7)
This effect expresses the variability in countries’ tendency to send ties to few or many other
countries. A positive estimate would indicate that those who already send many ties have an
increased tendency to send even more ties.
Finally, to control for the overall density of the cooperation networks, we include the
outdegree effect,
s
outdegree
i = ∑
j
xi j, (8)
which reflects the average tendency of actors to have ties with random others in the network and
as such functions as an intercept in the model. Negative β outdegree estimate suggests a low
expected odds of a link for a tie within a dyad of actors (i.e., network density below 50%),
whereas a positive estimate indicates high expected odds of a link (i.e., network density above
50%).
With the various dyadic and network effects (i.e., ski (x)), we are able to specify actors’
objective function (i.e., Eq. 1). To estimate the corresponding estimates β k, SAOM assumes that
the process of network evolution unfolds in continuous time, and that the observed moments are
snapshots of this process. SAOM then treats the changing network as the result of a Markov
process in which the current state of the network is a dynamic constraint on its development. This
enables SAOM to estimate the set of coefficients that best fit the observed changes in the network
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over time. Basically, β k is estimated by minimizing the difference between the observed and the
expected values. Since SAOM shares key characteristics with logistic regression, we can calculate
t-statistics from estimated coefficients and standard errors.5
Besides its actor-based framework, we also prefer SAOM in this study for another two
reasons. First, SAOM can explicitly take EU enlargement into account. The EU enlarged from 15
members in 2003 to 27 in 2007.6 SAOM explicitly models such changes to the composition of the
network and treats the new actors separately from the random missing data.7 This makes SAOM
particularly appropriate for our study.
Second, the Council of the EU includes several policy-specific working groups within the
same institution, which are therefore not independent committees. Rather than treating them
simply as independent case studies, it is desirable to conduct parallel studies of these specific
groups and combine them in a pooled analysis. This suggests a multilevel network analysis,
where the micro level is the network analysis within each single working group, and the macro
level is the combination of these multiple network studies (Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003). SAOM
solves this problem by assuming the observed cooperation networks of specific policy committees
are samples from a population, a population of cooperation networks of all policy-specific
committees. The true parameter values are a random sample from the parameter values in a
population of policy-specific committees. We use SAOM to calculate the distribution of these true
parameters in the population of policy-specific committees. This produces more generalizable
findings and provides an intuitive way to compare Coreper I with the policy-specific committees
taken together.
5For details about the estimation procedure, see Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010) and
Ripley et al. (2015).
6Our data precede the accession of Croatia to the EU in 2013.
7For details about SAOM treatments of the composition change and random missings, see
Ripley et al. (2015).
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V Results
We begin by testing the preference and network-based explanations in the higher-level
coordinating committee, Coreper I. We then turn to the policy-oriented committees that were
surveyed in all three waves (agriculture, environment, and taxation) and conduct multilevel
network analysis on these three committees. Finally, we extend our analysis to two other
policy-oriented committees (justice and competition) that were surveyed only in the last two
waves. For each set of analyses, we measure policy preference similarity in accordance with the
policy domain of each committee.
Table 3 presents our SAOM analyses of cooperation evolution in Coreper I. Given the
interdependent nature of cooperation networks, different network statistics can be highly sensitive
to each other. Recognizing the potential problem of collinearity, we present Model 1 with only
one basic network effect (reciprocity), and then incorporate preference similarity, triad, and hub
effects in a stepwise manner. The estimate for a given network effect in SAOM is the log odds
ratio of the respective probabilities that an actor will choose to initiate a cooperative tie. This
makes interpretations of SAOM estimates similar to those of multinomial logistic regression. For
example, in Model 1 the SAOM estimate of the reciprocity effect is 0.714, corresponding to an
odd ratio of 2.04 (i.e., e0.714 = 2.04). This suggests that with an existing cooperative tie from state
j to i, the probability of forming a reciprocal cooperative tie will be increased by a factor of 2.04.
[Table 3 is about here.]
Both the policy preference and network characteristics contribute to cooperation in Coreper
I. First, the preference similarity is consistently significant and positive in Models 2 to 4, although
its substantive impact declines as more network effects are included. Second, our analysis
confirms the earlier literature on the importance of reciprocity in cooperation emergence (e.g.,
Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Ostrom, 1998). Third, we find mixed evidence for the two triadic
effects. While the effects of transitive links become statistically insignificant as more effect
effects are included, the impact of facilitating links turn out to be even stronger. Specifically, in
Model 4 the SAOM estimate of facilitating links is 0.313. This means that when two states share
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five common friends (i.e. facilitators) rather than none, their probability of forming a tie is greater
by a factor of 4.78 (i.e., e0.313×5). we find both forms of hub effects (outdegree activity and
indegree popularity) are statistically significant in Model 4. However, we should be cautious in
assessing the substantive importance of outdegree activity. A very active state which initiated five
cooperative ties in the past compared to none, for example, has a greater probability of forming
another tie, but only by a factor of 1.32. In contrast, a popular state, which received five ties rather
than none enjoys considerable cumulative advantage in future cooperation, by a factor of 3.34.
[Figure 4 is about here.]
As an agent-oriented approach, SAOM uses simulation intensively, and the simulated
networks generated in the estimation process provide a convenient way to compare the relative
goodness of fit of different models. Based on 10,000 simulated networks for each of the four
stepwise models in Table 3, Figure 4 plots how well they fare against our observed cooperation
networks in Coreper I. Specifically, we use the distribution of outdegree (i.e. proposed
cooperative ties) and indegree (i.e. received cooperative ties) as the benchmark statistics. The dots
denote the corresponding statistics for different outdegrees and indegrees, and the solid lines help
reveal the general shapes of indegree and outdegree distributions. For simulated networks, we
plot the upper and lower bounds in dashed lines and their 90% intervals in shadowed regions. The
complete model (i.e. Model 4) performs best across both indegree and outdegree, with the solid
line both mostly covered by the shadowed regions and completely enclosed by the dashed lines.
In our following analyses, therefore, we present the results of a basic model and the complete
model only.
[Table 4 is about here.]
Table 4 presents the analysis of three policy-oriented committees, and two important findings
stand out from this. First, preference similarity consistently contributes to cooperation in each of
the three committees. Moreover, its substantive impacts seem to be larger than those in Coreper I.
Second, there is some noteworthy variation in other network effects such as triad and hub effects.
In the environment committee while both triad effects (i.e. transitive and facilitating links) are
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important, there are no significant effects of outdegree or indegree popularity (Model 8). This
suggests that environmental cooperation in the Council is not driven by a few active or popular
states. Instead, previously unconnected members are bridged by transitive and facilitating states,
and the whole network becomes increasingly “flattened.” By contrast, cooperation in the
agriculture committee exhibits the strongest hub effects but weakest triad effects (Model 6).
Finally, the committee on taxation policies occupies the middle ground with moderate triad and
popularity effects (Model 10).
[Figure 5 is about here.]
We combine the analysis of these three committees in multilevel network models as
discussed above (Models 11 and 12), and the estimates of these models can be interpreted as the
“true parameters” of a generic policy-oriented network. A comparison of these models with the
models of Coreper in Table 3 reveals very similar network effects. However, there is a marked
difference regarding the impact of preference similarity. To aid our comparison, Figure 5 presents
the expected impacts of preference similarity on the formation of ties in Coreper I and the generic
policy-oriented committee. The steeper slope in Figure 5.b indicates that preference similarity has
a much greater impact on the formation of ties in policy-oriented committees than in Coreper.
[Table 5 is about here.]
Finally, we extend the network analysis to cooperation in the justice and competition
committees, and the results are presented in Table 5. Given that the data for these committees do
not cover the three time points, any comparative inferences we might draw are less certain. Two
important network effects are significant in the evolution of the networks in these committees,
namely facilitating triads and indegree popularity. However, neither reciprocity nor preference
similarity remain significant in the full models. Two factors may help explain these variations.
First, compared to the previous analyses, we have only limited data about these two committees,
which were surveyed in 2006 and 2009 only. Second, as suggested in our discussion of multilevel
network analysis, there may be some systematic or random differences between various
policy-specific subcommittees. The absence of significant effects of preference similarity in these
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two committees suggest that we should be cautious in inferring that preference similarity has a
significantly greater effect in the policy-specific committees than in Coreper, as the comparison of
the multilevel model (Model 12) with the Coreper model (Model 4) implies.
VI Discussion
Our findings demonstrate that both network characteristics and preference similarity affect
cooperative relations between political actors. We examined several mechanisms through which
the networks in which actors are embedded affect their propensity to cooperate with others. The
evidence indicated that in the Council of the EU, transitive and facilitating links have significant
positive effects on the likelihood of a tie being established and maintained. This means that actor i
is more likely to cooperate with j if 1) there are many third actors with whom i cooperates and
who also cooperate with j (transitivity), and 2) if i and j are in a similar structural position
regarding their incoming ties, such that there are many third actors who say they cooperate with
both i and j (facilitators).
Social capital theory provides the insight that network relations bring significant benefits to
the social system as a whole and its members. Social systems held together with dense networks
of transitive and facilitating ties have social capital that enables them to overcome collective
action problems (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Similarly, in neoliberal institutionalist theory,
reciprocal ties create interdependencies that help states overcome collective action problems
(Axelrod, 1984). Actors who are embedded in network relations have opportunities to monitor
and sanction their cooperation partners for dissembling. In systems with high levels of social
capital, recalcitrant actors face retaliation by the severing of reciprocal links and/or links from
third actors. Researchers in other contexts have arrived at similar conclusions regarding the
effects of network structures on relations among interest groups and between interest groups and
public agencies (e.g., Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004; Berardo and Scholz, 2010). Our
findings indicate that these relationships also hold for international decision makers in the most
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powerful legislative body of the European Union.
Policy agreement between two actors positively affects the likelihood of a tie between them
even after controlling for network characteristics. Like our findings on network characteristics,
several previous studies also found this pattern in other contexts, with respect to interactions
among interest groups and between interest groups and public agencies (e.g., Bauer, de Sola Pool
and Dexter, 1972; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; König and Bräuninger, 1998; Carpenter, Esterling
and Lazer, 2004). The positive effect of preference similarity varies somewhat across the
committees we examined. We found the strongest effect of preference similarity in three
policy-oriented subcommittees (agriculture, environment and taxation), a weaker but still
significant effect in the high-level Coreper committee, but no robust and significant effect in two
policy-oriented subcommittees for which we have more limited data. Leifeld and Schneider
(2012) suggest that preference similarity is more important in politically charged settings where
actors are concerned primarily with influencing policy outcomes and less relevant in settings in
which actors exchange technical information. Our mixed findings with respect to the effect of
preference similarity indicate that the distinction between the political and the technical is
blurred, particularly in the regulatory intense environment of EU decision-making.
The research presented here also highlights the political reasons why the prospect of the
United Kingdom leaving the EU poses an enormous challenge for both the UK and the remaining
EU members. The UK is deeply embedded in the political system of the EU, and nowhere is this
more evident than in the preference alignments and cooperation networks in the Council.
Contrary to what some campaigners in the Leave side of the referendum campaign claimed, the
best evidence we have on preference similarity among member states shows clearly that the UK
has not been a preference outlier. On the contrary, the UK’s policy positions on controversial
issues show high levels of agreement with the positions of a broad range of other EU member
states. Moreover, the UK occupies some of the most central positions in the cooperation networks
we examined. The strength of these political ties, in addition to the economic, legal and cultural
connections, means that extracting the UK from the EU will be a wrench for both the UK and the
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other member states. The analyses also revealed the significance of indirect ties between actors
for the maintenance and development of cooperative relations. This implies that the departure of
the UK will also affect the cooperative relations between the remaining states. As a large state
with many incoming and outgoing ties, the UK connects many other pairs of states that are either
weakly connected or unconnected to each other. The departure of the UK will therefore be a test
of the strength of the social capital among the remaining members in years to come.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
size response density reciprocity transitivity facilitation degree, µ in, σ out, σ
Coreper I
2003 15 0.60 0.17 0.33 0.60 0.29 0.8 1.3 1.6
2006 25 0.84 0.20 0.48 0.36 0.31 3.7 2.7 3.0
2009 27 0.93 0.12 0.27 0.38 0.25 3.0 2.3 2.7
Agriculture
2003 15 0.93 0.33 0.66 0.56 0.49 2.4 2.6 2.7
2006 25 1.00 0.28 0.60 0.46 0.40 6.2 3.4 2.7
2009 27 1.00 0.22 0.45 0.37 0.28 5.6 3.8 2.2
Environment
2003 15 0.93 0.20 0.36 0.35 0.26 1.4 2.1 1.8
2006 25 0.98 0.17 0.44 0.44 0.33 3.3 2.6 2.3
2009 27 0.96 0.15 0.44 0.43 0.37 3.7 2.2 2.5
Taxation
2003 15 0.73 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.33 2.7 2.9 3.1
2006 25 0.88 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.32 3.6 3.1 3.3
2009 27 0.74 0.15 0.41 0.40 0.27 2.9 2.5 2.5
Justice
2006 25 0.84 0.22 0.52 0.39 0.36 4.1 2.8 3.1
2009 27 0.93 0.12 0.34 0.40 0.27 3.0 2.2 2.1
Competition
2006 25 0.84 0.21 0.38 0.45 0.30 3.9 3.1 2.8
2009 27 0.78 0.15 0.36 0.40 0.31 3.1 2.5 2.6
2
Table 2: Member states’ policy positions on the sugar sector reform
Issue Positions Member states
Size of price cut
No cut (high subsidy) PL
“Much smaller cut” than proposed
by the Commission
CY, EL, IT, ES
“Smaller cut” than proposed by the
Commission
FI, HU, IE, LV, LT, PT, SI
Cut of 33% AT, LU, NL
Cut of 39% BE, CZ, FR, DE, MT, SK, UK
Cut of more than 39% (low
subsidy)
DK, EE, SE
Amount of
compensation for
sugar producers
100% compensation EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, PL, PT, ES
“More compensation” than
proposed by the Commission
AT, BE, FI, IE, SI
60% compensation CZ, FR, DE, LU, NL, SK
40% compensation MT, SE, UK
Complete liberalization DK
Merging of A and
B quotas
Merge quotas then cut
AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, EL, IE,
IT, NL, PT, ES, SE, UK
Cut B-quotas first, then A-quotas if
necessary
CZ, HU, LV, LT, PL, SI, SK
3
Table 3: SAOM analysis of Coreper I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant rate (2003-06) 61.32 189.31 86.18 36.86
(8.79) (8.26) (8.12) (18.27)
Constant rate (2006-09) 6.70 6.86 7.43 7.52
(0.99) (0.98) (1.12) (1.05)
Outdegree (density) −1.130∗∗∗ −1.165∗∗∗ −1.147∗∗∗ −2.277∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.079) (0.117) (0.345)
Reciprocity 0.714∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗ 0.534∗∗
(0.149) (0.168) (0.203) (0.238)
Preference similarity (all) 0.845∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.593∗
(0.277) (0.258) (0.338)
Transitive triad 0.160∗∗ 0.057
(0.068) (0.154)
Facilitating triad 0.100∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.097)
Outdegree, activity 0.056∗∗∗
(0.020)
Indegree, popularity 0.241∗∗∗
(0.081)
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: SAOM analysis of three-waved committees
Agriculture Environment Taxation Multilevel-macroa
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant rate (2003-06) 187.63 60.26 15.79 17.99 57.83 34.27
(7.57) (9.87) (3.63) (5.30) (8.25) (23.68)
Constant rate (2006-09) 6.60 7.09 6.86 8.13 7.06 7.87
(1.00) (1.19) (0.97) (1.35) (1.05) (1.44)
Outdegree (density) −1.295∗∗∗ −2.914∗∗∗ −1.137∗∗∗ −1.662∗∗∗ −1.183∗∗∗ −1.981∗∗∗ −1.172∗∗∗ −2.652∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.529) (0.079) (0.415) (0.074) (0.337) (0.041) (0.205)
Reciprocity 0.774∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.373∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.317 0.795∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.234) (0.161) (0.200) (0.167) (0.223) (0.076) (0.109)
Preference similarity 0.795∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗
(by committee) (0.216) (0.307) (0.315) (0.343) (0.245) (0.288) (0.147) (0.199)
Transitive triad 0.037 0.277∗∗∗ 0.172∗ 0.015
(0.143) (0.098) (0.101) (0.063)
Facilitating triad 0.367∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.092) (0.088) (0.054)
Outdegree, activity 0.049∗ −0.004 0.022 0.047∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.020) (0.012)
Indegree, popularity 0.323∗∗∗ 0.141 0.182∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.089) (0.077) (0.048)
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
a For detailed information about constant rates, see the supporting information.
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Table 5: SAOM analysis of two-waved committees
Justice Competition
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Constant rate (2006-09) 7.87 8.05 7.70 7.97
(1.06) (1.44) (1.03) (1.27)
Outdegree (density) −1.433∗∗∗ −3.523∗∗∗ −1.414∗∗∗ −3.872∗∗∗
(0.120) (1.235) (0.124) (1.163)
Reciprocity 0.716∗∗∗ 0.229 0.756∗∗∗ 0.340
(0.235) (0.328) (0.245) (0.334)
Preference similarity 1.129∗ 0.849 0.724∗ 0.640
(by committee) (0.599) (0.725) (0.417) (0.538)
Transitive triad 0.220 0.195
(0.156) (0.162)
Facilitating triad 0.443∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.174)
Outdegree, activity −0.007 0.009
(0.046) (0.054)
Indegree, popularity 0.443∗ 0.359∗∗
(0.202) (0.162)
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Facilitating and transitive links between member states i and j
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Figure 2: Cooperative networks in Corper I
Note: States of red colors are non-EU members when the surveys were conducted.
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Figure 3: Dyadic preference similarity in Coreper I (all proposals included)
Note: States are ordered based on results of hierarchical clustering of similarity scores.
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Figure 4: Goodness of Fit of the Coreper I SAOM models in Table 1
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(b) Multilevel-macro (agriculture, environment, and taxation)
Figure 5: Expected impacts of policy congruence on cooperation initiation
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